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Abstract 
This chapter asserts that the management of the assets of defined benefit (DB) plans has been guided by 
a simple three-part paradigm. First, designers assumed that the generous equity risk premium observed 
in the past will be available in the future. Second, they have posited that a constant asset mix policy 
portfolio such as 60-40 or 70-30 (in stocks) will provide adequate protection against shorter-term equity 
markets volatility. Third, given the first two assumptions, it can be deduced the bulk of a fund’s human 
and financial resources can be spent attempting to add modest additional return to the fund’s policy 
portfolio return by taking on a modest amount of additional risk. We show that within this old paradigm 
framework, the average US DB pension fund performed reasonably well over the 10-year period ending 
2002. But we also show that the choice of policy portfolio largely determined total DB plan balance sheet 
mismatch risk, and that on average, this major risk went unrewarded over the 10-year measurement 
period. Our findings raise questions about the appropriateness of the old pension paradigm; instead, we 
assert that a new paradigm is required which include a defensible set of investment beliefs which include 
a time- varying equity risk premium; an integrative investment model that directly links a varying return 
opportunity set to DB balance sheet stakeholder income needs and risk tolerances; and a human 
systems-based decision-making protocol that can dynamically integrate the first two elements into the 
production of measurable stakeholder value over time. 
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Chapter 11
Why Pension Fund Management Needs a
Paradigm Shift
Keith Ambachtsheer
A paradigm is a lens through which to see the world. The lens through
which the institutional investment community has heretofore seen the
defined benefit (DB) pension fund management world has three facets.
First, stocks have outperformed bonds by about 5 percent per annum on
average in the past. Looking ahead, many DB plan managers believe that
this 5 percent equity risk premium will also be available in the future, as
long as one is patient enough. Second, many DB plan managers believe
that a 60:40 equity-bond mix provides sufficient diversification over the
shorter term to create long-term sustainability, while still providing a 3
percent risk premium as compared to a 100 percent bonds-only policy.
They see this as a good reward/risk ‘deal’; in fact, the experience of the
1990s persuaded many that even a more aggressive 70:30 mix could pass
the prudence test. Given the first two assumptions, resources allocated to
managing pension funds can mainly focus on generating additional net
return relative to a passively implemented 60:40 (or 70:30) policy portfolio.
The fundamental questions we address in this chapter flow from these
assumptions. Is this traditional lens a good one through which to see the
pension fund management world in the future, and if not, why not? What
would a better lens impart? Our approach is inductive, beginning with a
thorough examination of ‘old’ paradigm pension fund management prac-
tices and the results they have produced. We unearth material flaws in
current practices and suggest better ways to manage pension funds.
Performance under the Old Paradigm
It is well known that what gets measured, gets managed; hence it is not
surprising that the measurement of pension fund performance has histor-
ically focused on the third facet of the ‘old’ paradigm enunciated above.
Specifically, managers have been alert to how the fund has performed
relative to simply implementing the chosen asset mix policy passively. In
other words, managers ask was additional return produced, and at what
cost and risk? Answers to this question are available from the Cost Effect-
iveness Measurement (CEM) database containing 10 years of pension
performance data.1 The database includes information on 256 funds (142
American [$1.5 trillion], 90 Canadian [C$374 billion], and 12 each Euro-
pean [1328 billion] and Australian [A$70 billion]); of these, 114 were
corporate, 113 public sector, and 29 industry/other funds. Average fund
size was $9 billion versus a median size of $2 billion.
In the reported results that follow, all available performance data over
the ten-year period was employed including information on funds with less
than a full ten-year history. Specifically, all possible calculations were made
on the measure equal to [(annual total fund return) (annual fund policy
portfolio return)  (annual total operating costs)]. The resulting 2,671
fund ‘net implementation value-added’ (NIVA) metrics were analyzed.
Figure 11-1 reveals the results: the average NIVA was þ11 basis points
(bps), with a respectable t -value of 1.8, suggesting that active management
did add value over the 1993–2002 period. Even more interesting is the split
of total NIVA into its three components. Average ‘gross in-category value-
added’ was an even more impressive þ69 bps (t ¼ 11.2), while ‘mix
value-added’ subtracted an average 21 bps (t ¼ 5.9). Operating costs
brought total fund performance down a further average 37 bps.
These findings lead to two further important conclusions. First, operat-
ing with a 100 percent passive implementation style costs money, so the
proper benchmark against which to evaluate the þ11 bps NIVA finding is
not 0 bps, but the cost of pure passive implementation including all
relevant overheads. This consideration reduces the benchmark NIVA
from 0 basis points to, say, minus 9 bps. Consequently, a more realistic
estimate of average NIVA experience of the pension funds in the CEM
database, relative to a pure passive alternative in the 1993–2002 period, was
þ20 basis points. Second, the observed average NIVA of þ20 bps would
have more than doubled, had it not been for the calculated negative ten-
year ‘mix’ effect of 21 bps. This effect resulted from the funds doing
something other than following the standard database protocol of rebal-
ancing the asset mix weights back to those of the stated asset mix policy on
January first of each year. Below, we address the question of why actual
rebalancing strategies systematically underperformed, as compared to the
standard rebalancing protocol over the period.
The Asset Class ‘Alphas’: Good News and Bad News
Also worth investigating further is the question of which asset classes
produced the greatest ‘in category’ net value added, and whether we can
identify structural pension fund characteristics that are statistically associ-
ated with positive NIVA performance. Figure 11-2 displays the ‘in-category
selection alphas’ for seven major asset classes for all US funds in the CEM
database. These ‘in-category alphas’ are calculated by subtracting from the
annual asset class return, the return on a relevant asset class benchmark
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Figure 11-1. Did active management add value?
Source : Cost-Effectiveness Measurement Inc.
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Figure 11-2. Actively managed asset class alphas for US funds.
Source : Cost-Effectiveness Measurement Inc.
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portfolio selected by the participating fund. Note also that the direct costs
associated with managing investments within each of the seven asset classes
(i.e. either external fees or allocated internal costs) have been netted out.
In evaluating Figure 11-2, one should be mindful that the averages and
standard deviations were calculated from very large actively managed sam-
ples over the 1993–2002 period. For example, the domestic large cap stocks
category statistics are drawn from a sample of 1,770 annual observations.
Even the real estate and private equity sample sizes are 1,466 and 1,221
respectively. So from the perspective of standard tests of statistical signifi-
cance, all the calculated average asset class net alphas easily pass the null
hypothesis test, except for real estate. That leaves us with five positive asset
class alpha results, and only one negative one. That is the good news.
Having said that, the results also confirm that individual fund asset class
alpha outcomes vary greatly: this is the bad news. From a reward/risk ratio
perspective, none of the average asset class alpha performances are excit-
ing. The attractiveness of average selectivity within foreign stock investing
in developed markets scores best with an average reward/risk ratio of 0.3
(i.e. 2.2/7.6), and we suspect this success largely represents the systemic
under-weighting of Japan by most US pension funds over the 1993–2002
period. The very modest average 0.1 reward/risk ratio generated by the
private equity asset class provides a very sober view of selectivity risk here.
The 33.7 percent standard deviation suggests that being right on the asset
class is not enough. It means that, even though private equity as an asset
class may perform well, one can still end up with terrible results in the fund.
The implication is that, unless a fund has enormous confidence in its own
private equity manager selection skills, it had better pay careful attention to
manager diversification.
Of course, the observed great variance in private equity results could be
given a more positive spin. The results suggest that good manager selection
skills in this asset class have a very large payoff. Figure 11-2 statistics suggest
that similar conclusions (both negative and positive) apply to the domestic
small cap stocks and foreign emerging markets stocks asset classes.
The Negative Mix-Related Alpha Question: Is ‘Excess
Cash’ the Culprit?
We next focus on the highly statistically significant 21 bps average annual
loss due to asset mix-related reasons over the ten-year period displayed
earlier in Figure 11-1. Further research points to a likely contributor: in the
eight individual years when average fund policy returns were positive (i.e.
1993–2000), the average asset mix–related alphas were negative in each
year. In contrast, in the two individual years when the average fund policy
returns were negative (i.e. 2001 and 2002), the average asset mix–related
alphas were positive in both years.
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What does this year-by-year breakdown of the ten-year average 21 bps
result imply? It suggests that the holding of excess cash in relation to the
policy asset mix may be a culprit, a hypothesis consistent with the average
asset mix–related alpha being negative in each of the eight positive policy
return-years (average mix alpha was32 bps), and being positive in each of
the two negative policy return years (average mix alpha was þ28 bps). The
discovery that holding ‘excess cash’ may reduce the typical fund’s incre-
mental return by one-third sends a powerful message. Decisive steps should
be taken to minimize the negative impact of excess cash on total fund long-
term performance.
Is There Also a Pay-off from Actively Managing Pension
Fund Costs?
Figure 11-1 indicated that investment-related total operating costs captured
in the database averaged 37 bps annually over the ten-year period. Table
11-1 provides important additional information, where we note that the
database spans annual cost experience from a miniscule 1 bp to a hefty 236
bps (based on 2,450 observations). Indeed, the 10–90 percentile experi-
ence still encompasses a broad 15–58 bps range. This wide-ranging oper-
ating cost experience prompts an important question: is there an ‘excess
cost’ performance drag, in the same way that the analysis above suggested
there was an excess cash performance drag, over most of the 1993–2002
period?
The simplest way to address this question is to regress fund performance
(NIVA) against total operating costs. If there was an excess cost perform-
ance drag embedded in the data, it would show up as a statistically signifi-
cant negative cost coefficient—a hypothesis that seems to be the case. The
statistically significant cost coefficient was 0.48 (t ¼ 2.2), implying that
one basis point of additional operating cost reduced NIVA by an average
0.48 bps over the 1993–2002 period. While this is an important finding, it
raises three important further questions. First, pension fund management
Table 11-1 Annual Total Operating Costs (bps)
Low 1.1
10th percentile 14.5
1st quartile 23.1
Median 33.9
3rd quartile 46.7
90th percentile 58.4
High 236.2
Source : Cost-Effectiveness Measurement Inc.
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should experience significant economies of scale; what happens when we
adjust for this scale factor? Second, certain types of investment policies are
much more expensive to implement than others; what happens when we
adjust for this investment policy factor? Third, operating cost structures
may to some degree be country-specific; what happens when we adjust for
this country factor?
All three questions have interesting answers. First we find that the scale
effect averaged 19 bps. For every tenfold increase in fund asset value in
the database (total range $100 million–$150 billion), total operating costs
declined an average 19 bps. Thus large funds have a material cost advan-
tage over small funds. Second, the incremental cost coefficients for domes-
tic stock, foreign stock, real estate, and private equity mandates were þ38,
þ62, þ88, and þ199 bps. These metrics indicate average total operating
cost increases by shifting a fund out of bonds into domestic stocks, foreign
stocks, real estate, and or private equity respectively. Thus investment
policy choices do materially impact cost experience. Finally, adjusted for
scale and mix factors, Canadian funds experienced operating costs an
average 11 bps lower than their US counterparts. It appears that Can-
adian funds generally chose simpler investment management structures
and faced lower domestic external management fee structures. Out of the
total cost variance (measured by a standard deviation of 19 bps for the full
sample), these three cost drivers explained about one-half of the cost
variance.
Next we examine whether the three systematic cost drivers are respon-
sible for the measured ‘excess cost’ performance drag coefficient of 0.48
bps. This is assessed by reestimating the fund NIVA performance versus
fund operating costs relationship, but now using fund cost experience
adjusted for differences in scale, asset mix, and country. If the ‘excess
cost’ coefficient remains statistically significantly negative, it would indicate
that—regardless of fund size, mix, or country—eliminating excess costs,
like eliminating excess cash, has a positive performance payoff. The new
excess cost coefficient is, in fact, negative and significant [0.54; t ¼ 1.9].
Thus every basis point of additional scale-mix-country-adjusted excess cost
reduced NIVA by an average 0.54 bps over the 1993–2002 period. This
suggests that managing costs by ensuring that they have a positive payoff
matters, which is the essence of cost-effectiveness.
Two Cost-Effectiveness Strategies
What might specific examples of such ‘cost-effectiveness’ strategies be?
The CEM database offers two examples. First, there is no statistical differ-
ence between the gross alphas of comparable externally and internally
managed investment mandates. However, internal management is on
average 30 bps less costly and hence that strategy outperformed external
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management by an average 30 bps on a net basis. Second, every 10
percentage point increase in passive management was statistically associ-
ated with nine bps of additional NIVA. This suggests that significant
exposure to very low-cost passive management, together with concen-
trated active management, was generally a cost-effective, value-producing
combination over the period.
These findings add up to two important lessons. In assessing the attract-
iveness of within-asset class active management, it is first important to
distinguish between average experience, and the variability of that experi-
ence. For example, over the 1993–2002 period, active management was on
average successful in five out of seven major asset classes. However, with
that average success came significant potential for individual funds to
reduce return rather than enhance it. Second, a much surer way to increase
fund NIVA is to carefully manage excess cash and excess costs. The value of
having neither was easily worth as much as the total average value of active
management, but without its downside exposure, suggesting that there
may, after all, be something akin to the proverbial ‘free lunch’.
The Common Performance Driver: Organizational
Effectiveness
Our findings in turn beget broader questions. For instance, can we identify
a common driver of good (or bad) ‘alpha’ performance? What can we learn
about the attributes of high performance pension funds? Research during
the 1990s provides interesting answers to these questions. For instance,
anthropologists William O’Barr and John Conley (1992) caused quite a stir
with their book on pension fund management drawn from close observa-
tions of nine pension fund organizations over the 1990–1 period. These
evaluations led them to conclude that fund organizational structures were
the result of the funds’ historical origins, rather than from the disciplined
application of good governance and management practices. They also
found that deflecting responsibility and shifting blame seemed to be im-
portant motivators in the funds’ decision-making processes. For instance,
close relationships with outside services suppliers (e.g. money managers,
consultants, investment dealers, custodians) seemed to be an extraordin-
arily high priority for pension fund trustees and executives.
The pension community of the day reacted with shock and outrage to
these allegations, but when, two years later, fifty pension fund CEOs were
asked what they estimated their ‘excellence shortfall’ to be (i.e. annual
return shortfall due to internal governance and management problems),
the median response was a hefty 66 bps. When they characterized the
nature of their internal problems, most mentioned poor structure and
decision processes (forty-nine mentions), almost half mentioned inad-
equate resources (twenty-four mentions), and almost half spoke of lack of
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focus and mission clarity (twenty-two mentions). This feedback suggested
that perhaps O’Barr and Conley had found factors that did actually make a
difference.
Logically then, the next step in the performance driver discovery process
was to establish a statistical relationship between pension fund perform-
ance and the quality of governance and management practices. In an initial
study, Ambachtsheer et al. (1998) used 1993–6 NIVAs from the CEM
regressed on metrics representing the quality of a pension fund’s govern-
ance and management practices. These were calculated from the survey
responses of eighty participating pension fund CEOs. The heart of the
survey was forty-five statements related to a fund’s governance, manage-
ment, and operations practices. The CEOs were invited to give each of the
statements a ranking between one and six, depending on their assessment
how well the statement reflected reality inside their own organization. Each
statement was designed so that a six represented perceived best practice
and a one perceived poor practice. In each case, the average of the forty-
five statement rankings in each survey was designated as the ‘CEO Score’
for that survey. Thus in all, eighty ‘CEO Scores’ were calculated from the
eighty completed surveys.
The eighty CEO Scores were interesting: for instance, scores ranged
from a low of 3.0 to a high of 6.0, with both mean and median scores at
4.8. This meant that overall, the eighty raters felt pretty good about their
organizations (not one was below three at the low end, and one wag
assigned his organization a perfect six on forty-five counts). Having said
that, an overall three to six score spread is a good statistical range to work
with. Also, of the eighty CEOs, fifty-one represented corporate funds and
twenty-nine noncorporate (mainly public sector). The average corporate
CEO Score was 4.9 versus a 4.7 average for noncorporates; the difference
was not statistically significant though it suggested that corporate fund
CEOs had, on average, a somewhat higher opinion of their fund’s organ-
izational competence than did noncorporate fund CEOs of theirs. This
finding fits nicely with our earlier observation that corporate funds had
somewhat higher average NIVA performance over the 1993–2002 period
(12 bps) than did noncorporate funds. The statistical relationship between
the CEO Scores and fund investment performance, the data indicated a
‘CEO Score’ coefficient of 0.4 with a significant t-value of 2.9, using 1993–6
performance data. This meant that an additional point of CEO Score in
1997 translated into an additional average 40 bps of annual return over the
1993–6 period. A two-point ‘CEO Score’ increase, say from 3.5 to 5.5, was
associated with 80 bps of annual incremental performance. This finding
fitted nicely with the median 66 bps excellence shortfall estimate of the fifty
CEOs at the 1994 New York gathering.
We have now updated the analysis to 2000, as reported in Table 11-2.
Arguably, finding a statistical relationship between the CEO Scores and
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fund performance in this post-survey period would provide further con-
firmation that good governance and management matter most. First we
replicate previous findings for the 1993–6 period, and then we set out the
new results for 1997 only, then for 1997–8, then for 1997–9, and finally for
the full 1997–2000 period.
The evidence shows that funds with high CEO Scores were able to
maintain their average performance edge, relative to funds with low CEO
Scores, even after immediately after the survey was conducted in 1997. It
was only in the fourth year after the rankings were completed that there was
a material reduction in the performance edge of high CEO Score funds
relative to the low scoring funds. Note that the post-survey period coeffi-
cients were higher than the pre-survey coefficient of 0.4, until the year 2000
was included in the performance results. So it appears that a careful study
of governance and management practices can help in understanding and
hence improving pension fund performance.
Good Governance and Management Related to NIVA
Performance
We should recall that the ‘CEO Scores’ were composites of forty-five
individual statement rankings: approximately one-third of these statements
related to governance practices, one-third to management practices, and
one-third to operations. A test to determine which of the forty-five state-
ment scores correlated most closely with fund performance showed that
only eleven had significant positive correlation with fund performance. Of
these, six were governance-related and five management-related.
The statistically significant governance statements in the survey related
mainly to effective fiduciary behavior and selection processes, clarity in
delegation of authority, and a high level of trust between the governing
and managing fiduciaries. The statistically significant management state-
ments related mainly to clear strategic positioning and to the effective
Table 11-2 New Results: Fund Performance vs. ‘CEO Scores’
‘CEO score’ coefficient t-value
Pre-survey period
4-year period (1993–6) þ0.4 2.9
Post-survey period
1-year period (1997) þ0.8 2.7
2-year period (1997–8) þ0.6 1.9
3-year period (1997–9) þ0.7 1.7
4-year period (1997–2000) þ0.3 1.0
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development and execution of the fund’s strategic plan. These findings
represent a noteworthy convergence between what are deemed to be
generally good governance and management practices in the for-profit
and not-for-profit sectors as a whole, and what we now find is important
in the governance and management of pension funds.
An interesting issue is why the performance edge of the high CEO Score
funds began to diminish in the fourth year after the scores were captured.
Perhaps the high scoring funds of 1997 failed to work hard enough to
maintain a competitive advantage beyond 1997. Certainly, we find that
maintaining a competitive advantage requires as much work as it took to
achieve that advantage in the first place. This question deserves further
research.
Assessing Pension Fund Risk
Until this point, the discussion has not considered the risk side of the
pension fund management task. Figure 11-3 plots the net alphas (NIVAs)
−2%
−1%
0%
1%
2%
3%
0% 2% 4% 6% 8%
9-year implementation risk
9-year net implementation value added
Can 9-yr funds
US 9-yr funds
Perfectly
Indexed Position
Figure 11-3. Implementation value added vs. implementation risk.
Source : Cost-Effectiveness Measurement Inc.
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of all eighty US and Canadian funds with ten years of continuous data
against their implementation risk (i.e. the volatility of fund returns relative
to their respective policy portfolio returns). This implementation risk can
be thought of as the additional risk contributed by active management. As
noted above, the average NIVA realization was marginally positive. Now we
also see that the measured implementation risk for these funds ranged
from a low of virtually zero, to a couple of outliers in the six percent range.
Nevertheless, the bulk of measured experience was around two percent.
Statistically, the NIVA/Tracking Error Volatility coefficient was a positive
0.12, with a t -value of 1.9. So on average, funds garnered a marginal
amount of additional net alpha for a modest amount of additional ‘active’
risk. Thus our previous conclusion continues to hold: in an old paradigm
context, pension fund management was on average modestly successful
over the ten-year period ending 2002.
Next we explore the behavior of the fund return components that can be
attributed to the funds’ choices of asset mix policy. In the CEM data file,
these choices are represented by passively implemented ‘policy portfolios’.
Specifically, we are interested in the behavior of these policy portfolios
relative to the liability return requirements of each fund.2 These require-
ments are estimated in each case by calculating the return on a bond
portfolio (i.e. the ‘liability portfolio’) that mimics a fund’s liabilities in
terms of duration and inflation-sensitivity. Figure 11-4 addresses this ques-
−3%
−2%
−1%
0%
1%
2%
3%
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25%
Policy risk (Standard development of policy value added)
Policy
value
added
Can 9-funds
US 9-funds
Perfectly
matched
position
Figure 11-4. Policy value added vs policy risk.
Source : Cost-Effectiveness Measurement Inc.
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tion and it tells a much less positive story. In comparison with Figure 11-3,
for instance, nothing much changes on the vertical axis. Over the observa-
tion period, policy portfolio returns over/underperformed their respective
‘liability portfolio’ returns in a narrowþ2% to2% range (i.e. Policy Value
Added). However, looking along the horizontal axis (i.e. Policy Risk), one
notes that the policy mismatch volatility metrics for the Canadian funds are
now in the 7–12 percent range. For the US funds, the range is more like
15–20 percent. Further, there is no correlation between the liability-relative
excess returns and liability relative policy risks. So we derive two important
conclusions: first, the ‘policy’ risk of US funds dominated their ‘active’ risk
by a factor of about eight to one over the ten-year observation period.
Second, this outsized exposure to policy risk received, on average, no
compensation.
The database also provides direct evidence that, consistent with ‘old’
paradigm thinking, fund managers of late have made no measurable effort
to take into account the financial characteristics of their liabilities when
structuring their fund policy portfolios. A test was devised to compare the
asset mix policies of the 50 percent of US funds with the most inflation-
sensitive liabilities (82 percent inflation-sensitive, on average) with the 50
percent with the least inflation-sensitive liabilities (31 percent inflation-
sensitive, on average). It turned out that the two subuniverses had, on
average, identical asset mix policies: 63 percent equities, 32 percent fixed
income, and 5 percent inflation-sensitive investments. Even if the two
subuniverses had the same appetite for equity risk, one would expect that
the most inflation-sensitive half of the universe would favour inflation-
sensitive investment over fixed income investments. The reverse should
be true with the less inflation-sensitive subuniverse. Remarkably, this was
not the case.
The bottom line is that, when both recent bull market and bear market
experiences are included in the measurement period, and when we bench-
mark the realized policy returns against marked-to-market liability portfolio
requirements, the policy portfolios of DB pension funds generated very
little excess return for a highly material amount of balance sheet mismatch
risk in the ten years ending in 2002. (Thus, Figure 11-4 showed that most US
funds had policy risks in the 15–20 percent range.) Of course under ‘old’
paradigm behavior, these findings should not be surprising. We know, for
example, that ‘old’ paradigm typically behavior produces very similar policy
asset mixes without regard for differences in liability structures. We also
know that the observation period included the three-year ‘perfect pension
storm’ period (i.e. 2000–2), when both equity prices and bond yields fell
together; this led to massive marked-to-market funded pension ratio de-
clines in the 25–50 percentage point range. The profound question raised
by these findings is whether the ‘old’ fund management paradigm indeed is
the best lens through which pension fiduciaries should see their world.
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Why the ‘Old’ Lens Distorts
The old lens is not the best lens for pension fiduciaries to use today for at
least three reasons. First, the prospective equity risk premium will not
always be 5 percent, even over long periods: it can be predictably high,
normal, or low, with ‘normal’ about 2.5 percent rather than 5 percent.
Second, a 60:40 (or 70:30) asset mix policy is not always a good reward/risk
‘deal’ for the stakeholders in pension plans. This is because such a policy
will not always offer sufficient reward per unit of properly defined risk;
further, in some situations, such a policy is just absolutely too risky, regard-
less of whether the prospective reward is sufficient or not. Third, devoting
the bulk of a fund’s resources to attempt to generate a modest amount of
policy portfolio-relative ‘net alpha’ for a modest amount of policy portfolio-
relative additional risk may no longer be prudent.
To confirm that the equity risk premium is indeed predictably high,
medium, or low, we point to Figure 11-5 which plots almost 200 years of
equity risk premium predictions on the horizontal axis, against on the
vertical axis what actually happened (i.e. the actual excess return of equities
20.0%
15.0%
10.0%
5.0%
−5.0%
−10.0%
0.0%
25.0%
Estimated risk premium
Excess Return
−4.0% 0.0% 4.0% 8.0% 12.0% 16.0%
Figure 11-5. Equity risk premium & subsequent ten-year excess returns, 1810–1991.
Source : Arnott and Bernstein (2002).
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relative to bonds) over the ten-year period after the predictions were made.
The figure uses the simple rule of thumb that the ERP at any point in time
equals the current dividend yield plus the prior ten years earnings growth
minus the current long bond yield. Note the predictions on the horizontal
axis range from minus three percent to þ15 percent. The actual ten-year
outcomes on the vertical axis range from minus eight percent to þ20
percent (Arnott and Bernstein 2002).
The key issue is whether there is a positive relationship between the
equity risk premium predictions and the subsequent ten-year outcomes
purely random. The data show that this was indeed the case. Generally,
high predictions produced high outcomes, and low predictions low out-
comes. The rule of thumb equity risk premium prediction calculation
today works out to about þ1.5 percent.3 The figure says that when the
prediction is þ1.5 percent, the historical ten-year outcome range has been
about 7 percent to þ10 percent. There are no good reasons that we know
of why this range should not also frame ten-year equity-bond return
prospects today. If it does, the case for placing most of the risk chips in
pension funds on a policy portfolio with 60–70 percent equity exposure is
questionable.
Figure 11-5 also makes clear that even if the rule of thumb produced an
expected equity risk premium today higher than 1.5 percent, a policy
portfolio with 60–70 percent equity exposure might still be too risky, in
some situations. Pension funds of DB plans sponsored by corporations
struggling with poor operating results and weak balance sheets come to
mind. The figure also shows that in a world of varying equity risk premium
prospects, and varying abilities of fund stakeholders to withstand disap-
pointing outcomes in five to ten year timeframes, focusing largely on alpha
games, where the realistic stakes are a net 0.5 percent of extra return for
two percent of extra risk, makes little sense.
A New Lens
So pension fund managers need a new lens. Here are its three facets. First,
a set of investment beliefs grounded in good theory and confirmed by real
world experience. An important element of such a beliefs set should be the
notion of a predictably varying equity risk premium. Other elements will
reflect views on the return generation processes in various capital market
sectors and the predictability of those processes. Second, an integrative
investment model is needed that directly links a varying return opportunity
set to stakeholder income needs and risk tolerances. The essence of a
successful model is to capture the linkages between fuzzy expectations,
transactional friction, and stakeholder needs. Third, a decision-making proto-
col must be designed that can dynamically integrate components one and
two into ‘value’ for fund stakeholders. The essence of a successful protocol
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is effective human interaction. Thus its foundation must be alignment of
economic interests, good governance, and good organization design.
The implications of seeing pension fund management through this new
three-component lens can be best understood by being mindful of Ein-
stein’s observation that solving significant problems requires a higher level
of thinking than used to create them. For example, while Keynes’ 1936 opus
The General Theory was meant to address the economics of depression, it
contains a very powerful chapter on investment beliefs (Keynes 1961 Chap-
ter 12). With some restatement, Keynes believed that capitalism embodies
two distinct types of investment processes. ‘Long horizon’ investing is about
the projection and valuation of future cash flows. ‘Short horizon’ investing is
about zero-sum, adversarial trading in financial instruments. The mistake
many pension funds make is to try and blend these two radically different
investment processes together. In the ‘old’ paradigm, ‘long horizon’ strat-
egies are assumed to have pre-determined long term, static expected rates of
return. ‘Short horizon’ strategies, on the other hand, require ‘smart’ active
managers capable of producing positive net alpha. So, for example, most
‘active’ investment mandates today continue to be defined in the context of
static ‘long horizon’ benchmark portfolios, to which active managers are to
add some ‘alpha’ through over/underweighting strategies.
This is a highly restrictive, suboptimal delegation strategy, if two plaus-
ible conditions hold. The first condition is that the expected returns on
‘long horizon’ investment strategies are not static but variable, and to some
degree predictive. The second condition is that successful ‘active’ strategies
can be identified before the fact. These two conditions logically lead to the
internally controlled, dynamic, integrated ‘new’ paradigm reward/risk
management process further described below. Why is the long horizon/
short horizon distinction so important in this? Because there is persuasive
evidence that the returns on ‘long horizon’ investments are intrinsically
predictive, to some degree. In contrast, whether the returns on ‘short
horizon’ investment processes (most efficiently packaged as bundles of
active market-neutral strategies) are predictive, is in the eyes of the be-
holder. But what may be true for some can’t possibly be true for all.
There is no place for static ‘policy portfolios’ in this ‘new’ investment
paradigm. The integrative investment model sketched out in Figure 11-6
makes clear why. The only relevant benchmark now is the risk-minimizing
portfolio that looks most like the liabilities the pension fund is meant to
cover. Moving to the right on the horizontal axis implies taking on increas-
ing mismatch risk relative to this liability portfolio. In the ‘new’ paradigm,
all mismatch risk is ‘active’ risk. It no longer matters whether its source is
‘long horizon’ risky strategies, ‘short horizon’ risky strategies, or
some blend of the two. The vertical axis measures increasing amounts
of expected or realized excess return relative to the return of the risk-
minimizing portfolio. The 10 percent on the horizontal axis might
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represent the ‘mismatch risk budget’ that a fund management must work
within. The 1.5 percent on the vertical axis might represent the minimum
required price of risk (MRPR) that should be earned with a 10 percent risk
budget. The ellipse indicating the target performance area suggests that
now all that matters are balance sheet–relative results, and not policy
portfolio–relative results. Thus that is also what should be measured.
Earlier in the chapter, we provided statistical evidence that good govern-
ance and organization design matter. Such human system-based disciplines
lead to mission clarity, delegation clarity, effective strategic planning and
execution, and a high level trust within the pension fund organization.
These factors in turn drive superior organization performance, and getting
them right is just as important as getting the investment beliefs and the
investment model right. Specifically then, these factors become important
in actually moving the organization from the ‘old’ to the ‘new’ paradigm,
and in setting up the necessary infrastructure to run a ‘new’ paradigm
pension fund organization.
If this is the new standard against which to evaluate the practices of
today’s institutional investment community, how does it measure up? Un-
fortunately, most of the discussions we hear at various institutional invest-
ment forums continue to fit the ‘old’ investment paradigm far better than
the new. Nevertheless, there are glimmers of light, since some pension
fund executives are observing that they are being pressed by their boards
‘to become more tactical’. We take this to mean that some boards are
beginning to understand there is no such thing as a single policy portfolio
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Figure 11-6. Integrative investment model.
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for all seasons. Instead, the emerging view is that balance sheets should be
managed dynamically, sensitive to changing socioeconomic and capital
market conditions.
Another encouraging sign is the fact that conference agendas have been
giving greater attention to the importance of good fund governance and
organization design. Pension boards and investment executives themselves
have begun to pay more attention to these organizational factors. Pension
consultants are becoming more open to the possibility of a paradigm shift.
Investment managers with confidence in their investment skills are begin-
ning to see their world through a lens that splits investment strategies as
being either ‘long horizon’ or ‘short horizon’ based.
Conclusions
Pension fund management has been guided by a paradigm that appeared
to work well during the 1980s and the 1990s. It seemed to be a good lens
through which to see the world. The equity risk premium was generally
positive, as assumptions suggested it should be. Equity market dips were
short, and soon reversed themselves. Nothing happened that a 60–40 asset
mix policy apparently couldn’t deal with. In addition, our research con-
firmed that over the ten-year 1993–2002 period, a typical fund generated a
modest amount of ‘net alpha’ by taking a modest amount of ‘implementa-
tion’ risk relative to its policy portfolio. Under the ‘old’ paradigm, this was
an important accomplishment.
Then, during the three-year ‘perfect pension storm’ of 2000–2, the ‘old’
lens developed serious cracks. The surpluses on DB balance sheets turned
to serious deficits. With the benefit of hindsight, it became clear that the
asset mix policies of the 1990s exposed the stakeholders of DB balance
sheets to material mismatch risk. This experience has led many pension
boards and executives to ask if that material mismatch risk has now re-
ceded. Alternatively, could pension balance sheet stakeholders withstand
the financial pain if a 2000–2 type shock were to occur again a few years
hence. Related issues are how much compensation in terms of additional
expected return is sufficient for these risks to be undertaken, and what the
sources of that addition return will be in the future. Any pension organiza-
tion that thinks these questions are important can no longer be guided by
the ‘old’ paradigm. It needs a new lens through which to see the world.
Endnotes
1. Cost-Effectiveness Measurement Inc. (CEM) benchmarks the organizational
performance of many of the world’s largest DB and DC pension plans, both on
the investment and benefit administration sides of the pension ‘business’. The
author is a Founding Partner of the firm, located in Toronto, Canada.
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2. CEM estimates the ‘liability returns’ of participating DB pension plans by first
creating a bond portfolio that reflects the inflation sensitivity and the duration of
plan liabilities, and then estimating the marked-to-market annual return on that
portfolio.
3. The current stock dividend yield is about 1.5 percent. The referenced Arnott-
Bernstein paper (2002) suggests a good dividend real growth rule of thumb is 2
percent. The current yield on long TIPS is about 2 percent. So using the
simplified Gordon formula, we are looking at a current equity risk premium
estimate of {1:5%þ 2% 2% ¼ 1:5%}.
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